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Beyond Partisanship: Outperforming the Party Label with Local
Roots in Congressional Elections
Charles R. Hunt
Boise State University
Abstract
While factors like partisanship are increasingly decisive in congressional elections, they do not
fully explain variation in constituency support between similarly-situated incumbents. I argue
that legislators’ reelection success is also influenced by the depth of their local, pre-Congress
roots in the district they represent. I theorize that this local connection offers incumbents
practical advantages, such as built-in grassroots political infrastructure in their districts. Shared
local identity also allows legislators to relate to their voters on dimensions that is uniquely suited
to cross-cut partisanship and qualify them to represent their particular constituents. Therefore, I
argue that local roots positively influence incumbents’ electoral performance in the district from
that of their party - and more specifically, their party's presidential nominees. Using an original
dataset of nearly 3,000 House incumbents from 2002-2018 and novel measures of their preexisting local roots in their districts, I find that deeply-rooted incumbents outperform their
party’s presidential nominees in their districts by an average of about 5 additional points, even
after controlling for partisanship and other crucial factors. I also find that this impact grows as
the depth of local roots among a district’s voters increases. These results indicate that even in an
era of congressional politics largely defined by partisanship and presidential loyalty, dyadic
district connections like local ties can break through and affect legislators’ standing among their
constituents.
Keywords: Congress; congressional elections; political geography; local identity; partisanship
We’re about to find out whether partisanship is so deeply entrenched that federal races might as
well be censuses of Democrats and Republicans rather than contests between individual candidates
with unique strengths and weaknesses.
- Dave Wasserman (Cook Political Report and FiveThirtyEight Analyst)
The above quotation reflects a central puzzle in modern congressional representation that this paper takes up. Uttered
before one of the many special elections that took place prior to the 2018 midterms, it gives voice to the modern
consensus that nationalized partisanship stands nearly alone as the key determinant of vote choice at the federal level.
The public, the media, and scholars of American politics seem to agree that the partisan balance of a congressional
district and the national partisan mood together tell us almost everything we need to know about electoral competition
in Congress, and how a legislator is assessed and viewed by their constituents. The quotation poses the same question
I aim to answer in this paper: can factors other than a legislator’s party label matter in the eyes of their voters? More
specifically, can local ties that many legislators share with their particular communities break through in a time when
national partisan issues, attachments, and identities so heavily define congressional elections?
There’s no doubt that in an era of nationalized and party-competitive congressional politics, it is tempting to view
congressional districts as simply “red” or “blue.” In particular, analysts most often base considerations of district
competitiveness on the performance of previous party nominees for president there. But stopping at such figures
ignores considerable variation that still exists in congressional elections. This variation goes beyond partisanship and
is crucial for understanding congressional representation. Both Republican and Democratic incumbents in the House
run far ahead – and in some cases, far behind –other co-partisan candidates on the ballot, such as their party’s
presidential nominee. Even if both candidates come away with a win, this difference in margins has significant
implications for how members of Congress campaign for and subsequently represent their districts. An incumbent
who outstrips their presidential nominee in their district, for example, likely enjoys more political independence at
home and in Washington than they would otherwise. These legislators likely allocate staff differently, campaign
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differently, and relate to their constituents differently by not having to rely quite so much on explicitly partisan
connections between them. As I will demonstrate, the party label alone does not explain these differences; but what
does?
In this paper, I offer one understudied answer to this question: that even today, distinctly local, place-based
representational connections can cause constituents to assess their representatives more positively than they would a
standard-issue “generic” partisan. I examine the size and substance of the effect a legislator’s biographical roots in
their district have on how positively their constituents assess them at the ballot box compared to national partisan
figures like presidential nominees. I argue that this local connection, when shared as a common identifying value with
constituents, represents a key way in which members can break through the power of partisanship in modern
congressional politics.
I first demonstrate that while nationalized partisanship explains a significant portion of constituents’ actual vote
choices, it falls short in fully explaining electoral performance in the district that continues to deviate from partisan
expectations. I argue that the local ties manifest in a legislator’s biographical roots in their districts play a large part
in differentiating them from other partisan figures in the eyes of their constituents. I offer several potential mechanisms
by which local roots might have this effect, and argue broadly that local roots are a signal of shared local identity that
operates outside the bounds of nationalized partisanship. As a result, I argue, locally-rooted representatives
significantly outperform partisan expectations in their reelection efforts. I demonstrate this overperformance
empirically using multivariate analysis on incumbent House legislators from 2002-2018. Holding other relevant
electoral factors equal, I find that legislators with deep local roots run over 5 additional percentage points farther ahead
of their party’s presidential nominee in their districts compared to their more carpetbagging counterparts. I also show
that this effect size is even more significant in districts where voters’ own local roots are deepest. These results suggest
that having authentic roots in the communities they represent provides legislators with a local, dyadic connection that
helps them advance their electoral support in the district beyond that of national partisan figures like Presidents who
can achieve no such connection.
The Puzzle of Partisan Differentiation
At both the district and national levels, the influence of parties and partisanship has been the central focus of the
literature on congressional elections and representation for much of the last twenty years, and for good reason. Scholars
have compellingly argued that competition in congressional elections is now structured largely by partisan politics
(Bartels 2000; Herrnson 2015; Jacobson 2015; Jacobson and Carson 2015). Members have become more reliably
partisan in their legislative activity on Capitol Hill (Layman and Carsey 2002; Lee 2009; Theriault 2008), and their
constituencies have become more homogeneous in their partisanship due to natural demographic, ideological, and
geographic sorting (Bishop 2009; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Lang and Pearson-Merkowitz 2015;
Levendusky 2009), an effect thought by many to be augmented by partisan gerrymandering (McDonald 2006;
McDonald and Samples 2007). As a result, electoral dynamics in the district seem to be increasingly dependent on
both the partisan balance among a district’s voters, and the favorability of their representative’s party at the national
level leading up to an election. Moreover, the literature has asserted that because politics has become more
nationalized, voters do not meaningfully separate their assessments of their home-district representative and their
representative’s party (Abramowitz and Webster 2016; Hopkins 2018; Jacobson 2015). Under this assumption, the
only truly meaningful characteristic of an incumbent legislator is their party label; and therefore, the only meaningful
connection and identification with their constituents is a partisan one.
The data, however, do not fully bear out this trend in terms of observed vote choices at the district level. In practice,
many districts continue to “split tickets” in the aggregate at varying rates, demonstrating that partisanship is not the
only metric voters use when assessing their congressional representatives. Figure 1 displays this variation by plotting
the differences in the district-level victory margins between incumbent House members and their own party’s
presidential nominee in the 2002-2018 elections.1 This distribution illustrates Partisan Overperformance, a valuable
measure for understanding differences between legislators based on connections to constituents that go beyond party
attachment, and the primary dependent variable in this paper. These differences notably persist in both presidential
and midterm years.

1

The sample only includes incumbents with a major-party challenger; if included, unopposed incumbents would all appear in the far right end of
the distribution. For midterm years, this difference was calculated using presidential results from two years prior.

2

This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article. The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at Congress
& the Presidency, published by Taylor & Francis. Copyright restrictions may apply. https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2020.1811425.

[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Previous literature tells us that presidential nominees are crucial figures for understanding deviation from nationalized
partisanship. They are highly salient national figures whom voters can name and identify, oftentimes more easily than
with their legislators. They are also the overt leaders of the national party whose incentives lie in emphasizing broad
national issues that trigger national party attachments in the electorate (Lee 2009; Skowronek 1993; Whittington and
Carpenter 2003). Voters’ presidential vote choices have also become increasingly consistent over time, and are tightly
aligned with voters’ party identification and registrations. As a result, a voter’s choice in a presidential election is a
reliable proxy for an individual’s partisan attachment. Importantly for this paper, this attachment also plays out the
district level; in most electoral forecasters’ ratings (and in most reliable scholarly models) prior presidential vote is
commonly used either on its own or as part of larger indexes, to measure district-wide propensity to support one party
or the other for Congress. More broadly, strong between-office electoral alignment within a jurisdiction indicates that
constituents perceive and assess their legislator and their presidential nominees through a similar, partisan lens. In
such scenarios, the ostensible motivation behind the vote choice at both levels is party attachment. Therefore, if
nationalized partisanship were the only criteria by which constituents evaluated their representatives, then we would
expect most incumbents to perform similarly to their party’s presidential candidate.
However, only about a quarter of incumbent House members run within five percent of their party’s nominee, while
over half of all incumbents since 2002 were elected with a difference of more than ten percent in either direction.
Legislators who ran either well ahead or (in fewer cases) well behind their party’s presidential nominee continue to
make up a huge proportion of the House membership. This indicates that for reasons not fully explained in the
literature, a party’s House and presidential candidates are assessed differently by their constituents in the district for
reasons other than partisanship. I argue that one primary reason is that an incumbent possesses either an abundance or
deficit of local roots in the district, which are authentic place-based lived experience within the boundaries of the
district the incumbent represents. I theorize that these roots are indicative of a unique local connection that legislators
can share with their constituents that by definition exists outside of nationalized partisan affiliations and identities,
and thus increases local support for the legislator such that they overperform partisan expectations.
Defining and Valuing Local Roots
I argue not only that local roots have the potential to break through nationalized partisanship, but that they are uniquely
suited to do so in several important ways. First, local roots are specific ties to a district that predate a legislator’s time
in Congress, and can provide practical advantages based on name recognition, local political and economic networks,
and campaign communication opportunities unavailable to legislators with less familiarity in the district. The second
broad benefit is more abstract: I argue that local roots offer legislators significantly more opportunities to personally
relate to constituents of all partisan persuasions based on a shared, distinctly local identity that cross-cuts partisanship
and thus helps incumbents outperform partisan expectations in their districts.
Previous literature demonstrates the many ways in which legislators relate to constituents in “personal” ways that go
beyond partisanship and help them perform better in their elections than they otherwise would (Cain, Ferejohn, and
Fiorina 1987, p. 77; see also Mayhew 1974, Parker and Davidson 1979, Mann and Wolfinger 1980, and Friedman
2007). Other scholarship tells us that voters place high value in incumbent-specific attributes such as race, religion,
geography, and gender when deciding whether to reelect their representative (Fenno 2003; Gay 2001; Green and Guth
1991; Plutzer and Zipp 1996; Childs and Cowley 2011).
One particular subliterature, however, has touted the importance of local, place-based identity and geographic
closeness as a uniquely beneficial trait that legislators can share with their constituents, initially coined by V.O. Key
as the “friends and neighbors” effect (1949). This phenomenon is essentially the advantage candidates enjoy in the
town, county, state, or other geographic area that the candidate currently calls home, compared to other areas in their
electorate. Subsequent work has found general support for the friends-and-neighbors voting effect at different levels
of government (Johnston et al. 2016; Lewis-Beck and Rice 1983; Tatalovich 1975). These works have found, for
example, that constituents both recognize and value “local” candidates (Bowler, Donovan, and Snipp 1993; Jacobs
and Munis 2018; Johnson and Rosenblatt 2006; Rice and Macht 1987; Shugart and Valdini 2005; Stevens et al. 2018).
On the institutional side, parties in the comparative context have been shown to actively seek out candidates with local
ties, or limit their searches to within the constituency’s geographic area, even absent a residency requirement
(Gallagher 1980; Parker 1986; Parker 1982; Weeks 2008). Recent works have corroborated the representational
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importance of local connections (Jacobs and Munis 2018; Meredith 2013; Panagopoulos, Leighley, and Hamel 2017).
This collection of findings indicates that political actors in many contexts recognize and leverage place-based identity
as an electorally valuable connection between voters and their elected representatives.
The Local Roots concept I introduce in this paper builds considerably on these early insights about the importance of
geographic connections between candidates and voters. It widens the scope and potential power of local candidate
effects by examining legislators who represent smaller-scale local constituencies - in this case, congressional districts
- and the electoral benefits they garner by being locally-connected in an authentic way to their entire district as a
whole. In this paper, I use the logic of local identity that “friends-and-neighbors” scholars pioneered to theorize and
empirically demonstrate the electoral value that local connections provide to deeply-rooted legislators compared
against their “carpetbagging” counterparts in other districts. I also offer new potential mechanisms by which this
electoral value accrues. While these mechanisms are founded both in theoretical reasoning and (in many cases)
previous literature, they are not mechanisms I am specifically measuring in this paper. The findings I present later,
while striking and likely indicative of the operation of one or more of these mechanisms, are purely observational in
nature. The likely reality is that legislators’ local roots follow a multi-causal pathway in helping them achieve electoral
success and partisan overperformance, and that mechanisms differ in their impact across different types of districts.
At any rate, I leverage previous scholarship to argue that this pathway likely includes both practical and symbolic
advantages that strengthen the electoral relationship between legislator and constituent in ways that help incumbents
overperform partisan expectations. 2
First, I argue that local roots offer a legislator tangible, practical benefits in helping to build a deep and lasting coalition
of voter support in the district. These benefits stem directly from connections, coalitions and experience that are by
definition developed well before a legislator ever takes office; as such, deep roots can offer legislators a “head start”
in terms of political infrastructure in the district and broadening their base of support. For instance, legislator traits
like prior local political experience or long-term residential backgrounds in the district provide opportunities to achieve
a naturally higher baseline of name recognition and grassroots support. But local roots may also offer a deeper and
ultimately more meaningful and advantageous brand of name recognition that is not borne out of broadly-known
celebrity status (Hosein 2004; Street 2004), nor out of incumbency itself, but that is organically grown at the
grassroots. Previous work has theorized, for example, that local name recognition and local political connections are
one key mechanism fueling the “friends-and-neighbors” effect (Bowler, Donovan, and Snipp 1993; Gimpel et al.
2008; Johnston et al. 2016). A legislator with an extensive personal history in the district has by definition more time
and opportunity to establish a more expansive baseline of direct personal connections with important social, economic,
and political institutions, including local media outlets, political influencers and operatives, and local businesses. This
can happen organically before the legislator ever takes office, or in a recurring fashion over the course of their career. 3
These relationships can pay dividends particularly in the campaign context, where locally-rooted incumbents have a
great deal more representational flexibility than their less-rooted counterparts in other districts. Specifically, these
legislators’ reelection campaigns can feature extensive campaign communications that don’t have to rely merely on
partisan talking points, but can fall back on their local backgrounds and the perceived qualifications if necessary.
Therefore, even if voters do not pick up on a legislator’s local roots directly, they are exposed to them in the campaign
process through direct candidate appeals. This potential mechanism becomes particularly important when a legislator’s
party is suffering politically at the national level: as a practical matter, legislators with local roots simply have a more
diverse set of representational connections they can call upon in the campaign context if other connections (like
partisanship) are weaker or less reliable in a given year than they normally would be.
This mitigation of partisan risk speaks not just to the bonus that local roots provide for legislators who possess them,
but also to the significant challenges they present when they are missing from a legislator's resume. Incumbents who
lack local roots also lack the opportunity to make authentic place-based appeals to voters, which then forces them to
fall back on other (notably more polarizing) constituent connections like ideology or partisanship. With fewer
resources and less representational flexibility, these more “carpetbagging” candidates then must rely more on their
party or outside groups to support their candidacies, and often go on to underperform on Election Day even if they
end up winning. One such example is Alex Mooney (R). A representative for West Virginia’s 2nd District, Mooney
was born in Washington, DC, educated in Maryland, and ran for state legislative seats in both Maryland and New
2
3

In fact, Table A7 in the online appendix demonstrates that the effects of local roots are largely consistent regardless of how long a legislator has
served.
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Hampshire before finally moving to West Virginia less than a year before his first successful congressional run in
2014. Mooney was barely reelected in 2016 and 2018 by margins 22 and 27 points lower than that of his party’s
candidate for President, Donald Trump.
The practical potential advantages local roots provide are obviously desirable for any reelection-seeking legislator,
and are sorely missed when local roots are absent from their profile. However, a number of more abstract (but equally
meaningful) representational advantages may also be at work that could be attributed to local roots. First, many kinds
of shared nonpartisan characteristics between representative and constituent have been shown to have a broadly
positive valence with voters and increase an elected leader’s favorability. Voters prefer candidates with whom they
share common identities and characteristics, particularly for salient identities like race, gender, and partisanship (Bobo
and Gilliam 1990; Fraga 2016; Grose 2011; Matson and Fine 2006; Plutzer and Zipp 1996; Mason and Wronski 2018;
Theodoridis 2017), largely because shared identity is a valuable cue for voters as to who they trust to represent them
(Fenno 1978, Mansbridge 1999). Consequently, while politics is undoubtedly nationalizing to some extent (Hopkins
2018), localness has been demonstrated to be a key identity for many, and one for which they reward their legislators
for sharing with them: robust experimental scholarship has replicated “local candidate” effects at the voter level by
leveraging local identity cues (Panagopoulos, Leighley, and Hamel 2017; Sajuria and Collignon 2018).
I argue that this happens not just for the practical reasons addressed earlier, but also because close local connections
reflect an underpinning of trust stemming from mutual interests, backgrounds, and identities that are unique to the
particular district (Fenno 1978). Local roots represent a valuable connective tissue that creates a sense of trust among
constituents that a legislator has their best interests at heart and truly are “one of them” on dimensions that have little
if anything to do with their partisan label. For example, in Fenno’s qualitative masterpiece Home Style, he interviewed
(among many others) a member of Congress who attributed his electoral success as being rooted in trust and distinctly
local identity because of his background before he came to Congress. He went to high school and college in the district,
was a star athlete, and held local office shortly after graduating. Asked why voters seem to trust him so much, the
member replied that it was mainly “because they’ve known me over a period of years. They know my father and my
family’s reputation. I’m a known quantity… people know your general reputation, your family name, your kids. They
know you in athletics. People can put their finger on you.” (Fenno 1978, 79) If a representative grew up in their district,
went to a local high school, or owns a business that’s a local institution, their voters might recognize these as
credentials that qualify them to represent their interests in the House. Therefore, when both constituents and their
representative both have a meaningful personal history in and around the district, it creates an overlapping identity
that informs how well-represented constituents feel.
Fenno’s classic observations illuminate another potential mechanism for why local ties might help incumbents
differentiate from their presidential counterparts even amidst this more nationalized partisan era. Because parties - and
partisan voting patterns themselves - used to be much more local and decentralized, the kind of partisan alignment at
the district level captured by Figure 1 was likely much less predictable, or at least more heterogeneous based on other
factors like race or geographic region (Hopkins 2018). Presidential voting patterns at multiple levels - in individuals,
districts, and states - were far less consistent from year to year, in part because of high levels of split-ticket voting
based on conceptions and expectations of the “personal president” that induces voters to cross party lines and vote for
them (Campbell and Miller 1957). In the years since, parties have become significantly less decentralized, a process
that is embodied by the accentuated role of presidential nominees as the nationwide leaders of their respective parties
(Rogers 2016; Zingher and Richman 2019). Voters’ nationalized partisan attachments are highly predictive of their
presidential vote choices in particular. As a result, voters’ assessments of presidents and presidential nominees has
leapfrogged congressional vote choice as the truer signal of party attachment. Meanwhile, voters continue to value
personal ties, but are finding them in a more natural venue: their local representatives in the House. Therefore, the
consistent impact of personal ties such as local roots today may be due not just to constituents’ perceptions of their
representatives in the House as primarily local figures, but also their increasingly rigid perceptions of presidents as
primarily national, partisan figures.
Regardless of whether the mechanism is primarily practical, symbolic, or both, I argue that a shared local background
translates into votes that diverge positively from expected partisan support. At the voter level, local roots might
accomplish this at the ballot box in any or all of three ways: by inducing unaffiliated or even out-party voters to support
them based on shared local identity; imbuing co-partisan voters with a sense of personal loyalty that makes them more
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likely to turn out in the general election; or motivating supportive constituents to vote all the way down the ballot.4
Local roots therefore may have effects that go beyond ticket-splitting. However this increased electoral support
manifests in practice, I argue that the result is a consistent overperformance relative to partisan fundamentals:
Hypothesis 1: The deeper an incumbent legislator’s local roots in their district, the better they will
perform electorally compared to their party’s presidential nominee.
As previously discussed, much of the theorized effects of candidate traits and identities are partly conditional upon
whether these traits are shared and valued by voters. Foundational works on descriptive representation tell us that
voters appreciate when candidates for various offices are more “like them” based on any number of descriptive traits,
and that the more descriptive symbiosis exists between representative and constituency, the stronger their bond is
likely to be, and the better incumbents perform in elections (Mansbridge 1999; Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2003;
Banducci et al. 2004). The literature also tells us that place-based identity is no exception to these contextual effects.
Previous work indicates that candidate traits like local birthplace is more highly valued as a candidate credential in
jurisdictions where localism and “place” are particularly relevant and important parts of constituents’ identity (Childs
and Cowley 2011; Panagopoulos et al. 2017; Sajuria and Collignon 2018).
Therefore, I also argue that while local roots are an incumbent trait that voters of all stripes can appreciate, the extent
of this appreciation as measured by vote choice will be greater among constituencies who themselves have deeper
local ties to the district. To proxy these local ties at the district level, I utilize a measure of long-term geographic
mobility in the district – specifically, an American Community Survey measure of the percentage of a district’s votingage constituents who were born in their current home state.5 I argue that when long-term district mobility is low (that
is, when more voters have lasting local ties), the homespun quality of the district’s culture becomes a more salient part
of its unique identity, much like the prevalence of a certain racial or ethnic population would increase the salience of
that identity. A district with low levels of long-term geographic mobility, in which local background and attachment
is a defining characteristic of the community, should be expected to place a higher value in representation with deep
local roots, particularly as they contrast with nationalized presidential partisanship. More practically, voters are more
likely to have had actual experience observing or perhaps crossing paths with their legislator in some capacity,
including less direct experience like reading about them in local media outlets, if they grew up in the same place, thus
amplifying the aforementioned advantages of name recognition and local trust. Therefore, I argue that the extent to
which a constituency views local roots as a desirable quality in their representative depends on how locally-rooted the
constituency itself is.
Hypothesis 2: The effects of Hypothesis 1 will be substantively larger for district constituencies who have
more extensive local ties themselves.
Data and Methodology
For the dependent variable (Partisan Overperformance), I subtracted the two-party margin of victory for the
presidential nominee from the legislator’s party in their district from that of the actual legislator using merged districtlevel election return data from Congressional Quarterly Elections (for House vote shares) and DailyKos Elections (for
presidential vote shares). Capturing the primary independent variable -- legislators’ local roots in their districts –
required a more substantial undertaking. The goal was to establish legislators’ meaningful geographic presence in
their district at multiple points in their personal history preceding their service in Congress. The seven component
measures I have captured do so, and serve as important landmarks of legislators’ local roots in the district. All measures
were collected originally by the author for every incumbent running in the nine elections spanning 2002-2018 using

4

This paper uses observational data at the district level, and therefore does not measure the specific mechanisms proposed here; however, it is the
author’s hope that future work might identify which of these mechanisms is most operative at the voter level.
5
This measure varies considerably across districts, and a distribution can be found in Figure A3 in the Appendix. While a slightly more precise
measure of, for example, percentage of voting-age constituents born in their congressional district would have been preferable, no such measure
exists.
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the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, the U.S. Census Bureau, and Congressional Quarterly’s
Member Profiles.6 Below I will briefly describe the coding process for each type of local roots 7, and distributions of
these measures across the nine election cycles in the data can be found in Figure 2.
•

•

•
•

Local Political Dynasty - First, to capture early political roots in the district, I employ a little-used
measure of whether or not an MC is part of a local political dynasty - that is, whether or not their family
has held a previous elected office that overlaps with, and thus has appeared on the ballot in, the district.
The Biographical Directory of the United States Congress systematically captures this data point for
federal offices, which I extracted from the text using regular expressions. For non-federal offices, I used
CQ’s Member Biographical Profiles which and a variety of other biographical sources that include these
legacies.
Local Birth and Educational Attainment –These include four binary indicators of whether a legislator
was born, went to high school, college, or graduate school in their district. I code these measures based
on whether the city or town of an MC’s birth or educational institution is either fully or partially located
in their current district.8
Local Political Experience - This type of experience means service in local office that overlaps with
the district such as mayor, city/town council, county-level office, or local boards (Board of Supervisors,
Zoning Board, School Board, etc).9
Local Business Ownership - The final component measure is whether an MC owns a business in the
district. Using CQ’s Member Biographical Profiles, which provide extensive narrative descriptions of
an MC’s pre-Congress career and political journey, I manually coded which members of Congress had
begun businesses of their own or inherited a local family business in cities and towns that intersect with
their districts.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]

These previously underutilized variables will be tested primarily as part of an original Local Roots Index that adds
together the component variables to create a scale from 0-7.10 While these components all measure the underlying
concept of a legislator’s local roots, they also capture differing mechanisms by which local roots can be impactful. 11
Adding these components together into the Local Roots Index ensures that there is no bias towards or against any one
of these mechanisms, and that legislators get proper credit when they possess more than one of these background
attributes.12

6

While detailed and reliable, one limitation of this data is that it only covers candidates who have actually served in Congress. Most of the local
roots indicators come from official Congressional biographies. This is a notable limitation primarily because of potential selection bias that exists
by restricting the analysis to incumbent members of Congress (Gelman and King 1990). As such, the Local Roots Index I use in this paper is not
precisely a measure of “local roots” as it applies to any congressional candidate, since most such data is unavailable for lesser-known challengers
and open-seat candidates for whom reliably-coded biographies do not exist. As such, I make no claims that the effects I find in this paper are
precisely those of all candidates for the House, but rather for incumbents only. However, as demonstrated in Figure A1.4 in the Appendix, the depth
of local roots varies extensively across incumbent MCs, making the measurement of its impact possible in a cross-sectional context – this is also
the only acceptable theoretical route, since local roots by definition do not change over a legislator’s career absent a substantial redistricting.
Secondly, on a substantive level, the motivations, contexts, and levels of political interest on the part of voters, donors, activists, and parties for
incumbent MCs are so fundamentally different from those of generic congressional candidates, that including both sets in the same analysis would
not only be problematic methodologically, but would ignore the fact that as actual members of Congress with lawmaking power, incumbents are a
much more substantively impactful unit of analysis than challengers or open-seat candidates.
7
Tables A2-5 in the Appendix display observational examples of each in the data.
8
The U.S. Census Bureau’s Place Relationship File indicates which congressional districts intersect with each American city’s geographic
boundaries within a particular Congress. It is possible that the exact geographic location of their birth is not technically located within the boundaries
of the district; but city/town overlap is the metric most likely to be perceived and valued by voters. This is the same distinction made for the High
School, Undergraduate and Postgraduate In-District measures.
9
Although it is theoretically possible that an MC gained their local political experience or political dynasty in a geographic area that does not
overlap with their congressional district, manual checks of MCs with this designation corrected any observations in which this might have been the
case (very few existed).
10
No MC over this period scores positively for all 7 component measures, making the scale 0-6 in practice.
11
Alternate specifications of the Local Roots Index – including one utilizing factor analysis, and another that breaks out individual effects of the
seven component indicators – can be found in Figures A1.1 and A1.2 in the Appendix.
12
In all models and robustness checks, I control for whether the incumbent had any postgraduate degree; generic business experience; or prior
elected experience regardless of location, all to ensure that these three components of the Local Roots Index are capturing only the place-based
dimension of this qualification.
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Beyond this primary independent variable concept, I include two crucial controls for partisanship. First, I measure the
extent to which an incumbent has a strong partisan advantage in their district compared to their major-party opponent.
This is operationalized by capturing how partisan a district is compared to the rest of the country as a whole using a
modified version of two-party presidential vote in the district in prior elections. I argue that the steepness of the
partisan balance of a district affects the extent to which an incumbent legislator can rely on co-partisan voters for
reelection. That is, the more heavily partisan a district tends to vote, the more likely elections are to be decided on
those terms at all federal levels, much as a majority-minority district will more heavily feature race as an issue or
deciding factor for voters. Therefore, the more one-sided a district’s voters are in terms of partisanship, the greater
alignment in vote share we should expect between incumbent legislators and presidential candidates. To capture
partisan balance, I use the Cook Political Report’s Partisan Voting Index (PVI). The PVI has two distinct advantages
as a measure of nationalized partisanship in the district: first, it compares the partisan voting behavior of the district
to the national average, thus putting all districts on a consistent plane of measurement; it also averages behavior from
the previous two presidential elections, thus avoiding selection bias on a particular election or candidate. Both
advantages also help to avoid entanglement with the dependent variable in this particular model.
National political conditions also affect voter behavior in the district for a number of reasons, including attention to
national issues, affecting the opinions of independent constituents, and mobilizing (or de-mobilizing) partisan ones
(Herrnson 2015). For example, when national political conditions favor the party opposite the president, then copartisan incumbents may be incentivized to distance themselves from their party’s leader in their campaigns. To
capture contemporary national partisan mood, I use the RealClearPolitics average of the two-party share of the
“Generic Congressional Vote” ballot question at the national level in a given election. The generic ballot question has
been shown to be a reliable indicator of national political conditions, and as such is a significant predictor of electoral
dynamics in the district. It also is specifically tied to Congress, making it more appropriate to predict congressional
election outcomes.
Additionally, there are a number of factors that fall outside of a partisan framework that have been found to affect
district electoral dynamics. The most significant of these is the quality of the challenger in the congressional election.
High-quality challengers have been found to significantly affect how well incumbents perform electorally by raising
and spending money, running ads that challenge them publicly, and forcing them to respond to public issues (Bond,
Covington, and Fleisher 1985; Krasno and Green 1988; Squire 1992). Since presidential contests in the district always
feature two well-known (and usually highly-qualified) candidates, an incumbent’s race more closely mirrors their
presidential counterpart’s when they face a quality challenger. Therefore, the presence of a quality challenger should
have a negative effect on the ability of a legislator to outperform a presidential nominee regardless of a legislator’s
local roots. I operationalize this using the commonly-used indicator of whether a challenger has prior elected political
experience at any level of government.
Another important control included is that of a legislator’s length of service in Congress. This is an important factor
not just in congressional elections generally, but is particularly relevant as a potential differentiator between legislators
and their party’s presidential nominee. Most legislators have appeared on the ballot in their district several times,
while presidential nominees are appearing for only the first or second time. Longer-serving legislators have also had
extensive opportunity to build their relationship with voters and leaders in the district regardless of their preestablished roots, whereas most voters have little to no opportunity to “get to know” presidential nominees outside of
national media. As a result, tenure length is a potential driver of outsized vote share in the district for legislators
compared to presidential nominees.
I also address race as a key potential difference in the way constituents view their congressional representative as
opposed to a presidential candidate. We know, for example, that descriptive representation that is not necessarily
partisan can be deeply advantageous for incumbents who match their districts, and help them electorally by increasing
participation among attribute-sharing constituents (Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004; Bobo and Gilliam 1990).
More specifically for this study, race differences between an incumbent legislator and their party’s presidential
nominee may create meaningful differences in constituent appraisal of the two. I therefore include a binary indicator
for whether the incumbent and their presidential counterpart are the same race. Other control variables include whether
the legislator faced a primary opponent and whether they held a leadership position in Congress. Primary opposition
may weaken incumbent House members or force them to spend more resources, thus deflating their general election
margins and bringing them closer to their party’s presidential nominees, who also tend to face contentious, resource-
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draining primaries. The directional effect of chamber party leadership is less clear, but likely produces a different kind
of relationship with their home constituents that may more closely resemble that of a presidential candidate, as opposed
to the relationship established by a back-bencher member of Congress.
I have also included whether the state in which the election is occurring allows single-mark straight-ticket voting. This
condition should naturally deflate the marginal differences in electoral performance between presidential candidates
and their co-partisan neighbors on the ballot, since voters in these states can choose all same-party candidates with
one vote. Finally, I include a linear “time” variable, since partisan alignment between congressional and presidential
candidates has descriptively increased over the course of the time period tested (2002-2018).13 To estimate the effects
for both Hypotheses, I employ mixed-effects multilevel regression with random intercepts by legislator, to account
for repeat observations of incumbents across time.
Results
The results of these tests, as shown in Table 1, demonstrate clearly that legislators’ local roots in their districts
positively shape their electoral standing among their constituents. These results demonstrate that the depth of an
incumbent legislator’s local roots have extensive and statistically significant positive impacts on their voters’
assessments at the ballot box compared to their party. The Local Roots Index is statistically significant well below the
.01 level in predicting overperformance relative to their party’s presidential nominee. Other control variables of
interest, including terms of service in Congress, challenger quality, and straight-ticket voting also have their expected
effects.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
To get a sense for the more precise effect of an incumbent’s local roots on partisan overperformance, I generated
predicted partisan overperformance based on different values of the Local Roots Index, which range from 0 to 6 as
observed. The result of these predictions can be found in Figure 3, which displays the linear effect of a legislator’s
local roots bounded by 95% confidence intervals. We see from this Figure 3 that an incumbent legislator with no local
roots (a zero on the local roots Index) runs, on average, about 6 points ahead of their party’s presidential nominee in
the district. This six-point advantage reflects the well-documented benefits of the incumbency advantage, including
the “personal vote” and legislator tenure length, available to all congressional incumbents. However, this difference
is outshined by the predicted difference gained by incumbents with deep local roots (6 on the Local Roots Index).
These legislators, by comparison, enjoy a positive partisan differentiation in their districts of a little over 14 points.
This marginal effect of around 8 total points demonstrates that deep shared roots induce voters to support legislators
by margins that go beyond those predicted by simple partisanship, and which do so on top of the traditional advantages
that legislators have in their districts over national figures. They also do with high levels of statistical confidence.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
The substantive effect of deep local roots for incumbents is even clearer when compared directly to that of a lengthy
tenure in Congress (defined here as nine terms).14 As discussed earlier, a long-serving legislator has had the
opportunity to cultivate a reputation in the district during their time in Congress using the power and privilege of the
office, and other advantages that come with incumbency. These are advantages that even nationally-known partisan
figures like presidential candidates do not possess. But, as Figure 4 indicates, the effect of deep local roots (5-6
additional points) is the same or larger than the effect of serving in Congress for a significant period of time. The fact
that a legislator’s pre-existing local roots meets or exceeds these effects indicates that who they were before they
arrived in Congress may matter just as much – if not more – to their voters than the time they actually spend holding
office.
This could be the case because of how time spent in Congress is defined primarily by partisanship in recent years.
Much of Washington activity is determined by party leaders in the chamber or policy choices by the president,
significantly constraining the amount of time and activity legislators can expend differentiating themselves. In this
way, legislator’s service in Congress is tinged with partisanship almost no matter what they do. Having served in the
13

Descriptive statistics for all observations in this paper can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix.
The total effects of both the Tenure Length and Local Roots in Figure 4 are captured by generating predictions of Partisan Overperformance at
the 10th and 90th values of the independent variables to avoid outliers.
14
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chamber for a long time, while beneficial in other ways, may therefore not be as useful in helping a legislator establish
a reputation that could transcend partisanship and be personally attributable to them. Local roots in the district, on the
other hand, have no such baggage in part because they are in place long before a legislator’s service in Congress and
thus exogenous to any activity that occurs after they are first elected. Their association is with distinctly nonpartisan
qualities that constituents of any political persuasion can find appealing. It is perhaps not so surprising, then, that local
roots help differentiate voters’ assessments of their legislator from their party label at least as much as their seniority
in the chamber.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
Given a number of systematic differences between presidential and midterm election years, it was also important to
test the effects of local roots separately for each type. One might expect, for example, that during midterm elections,
incumbents (and congressional campaigns generally) occupy more space in the average voting constituent’s mind than
in presidential years. This is what I find, though the effects of local roots hold both substantively and statistically when
limited either to either election type. Regardless of the sampling, the effect of local roots on Partisan Overperformance
meets or overtakes those of tenure length, challenger quality, racial alignment, and other variables thought to create
recognizable differences between House members and their party’s presidential nominees.
Hypothesis 2 engages with the question of whether these vary in the extent to which a district embodies or values local
roots as a characteristic of their elected representatives. Previous work has shown that the type and extent of voters’
place-based identity has impacts on their likelihood of voting for approving of local candidates (Sajuria and Collignon
2018) or of responding to place-based candidate appeals (Jacobs and Munis 2018), primarily using experimental
methods or survey data. With Hypothesis 2, I extend these findings into the observational sphere. I argue that local
legislator roots make a bigger substantive impact on vote choice when that their constituents themselves also have
deep roots in their communities.
This is precisely the effect I find when splitting the sample based on the depth of district constituency roots in their
geographic area. Figure 5 demonstrates incumbents’ predicted levels of overperformance in their districts relative to
their party's presidential nominee separately for districts with low, medium, and high levels of local constituency roots.
Notably, increases in the depth of incumbents’ local roots helps them overperform their party’s presidential nominee
in all three district subgroups at statistically significant levels. Local roots therefore seem to be a desirable
characteristic for any incumbent. But we also see that as constituency roots increase, so too does the effect of
incumbents’ own local roots in their district. These differences are statistically significant at the .03 level.15 These
findings demonstrate a clear and meaningful descriptive connection between representatives and constituents that
cross-cuts presidential partisanship and has significant and lasting effects on congressional elections.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
Discussion
Much of the literature on congressional elections and representation of the last twenty years has focused on the effects
of partisanship on the actions of members of the House, the voting behavior of their constituents, and the electoral
relationship that binds both groups together every two years. Both scholarship and popular media posit nationalized
partisanship, particularly as it relates to support for the president and presidential nominees, as the foundation on
which the representative relationship in Congress currently rests, with the corollary that almost nothing can break
through it.
These results show that the literature has prematurely dismissed local connections as a binding identity in many of the
relationships that members of Congress share with their constituents. The local roots a legislator develops in the district
prior to their time in Congress, particularly when shared with constituents who also possess them, have a clear and
substantive effect on the nature of this relationship as enforced through elections. The variation in how voters evaluate
their representative versus their party label has likely decreased as partisanship has become more salient, well-sorted,
and well-defined; but member and district-specific factors like local identity continue to have an impact on the positive
15

One typical way to ascertain statistical significance of differences is by comparing the unstandardized betas using the following z-score formula:
z = (B1high constituent roots - B2low constituent roots) / √(SEB12 + SEB22). This was the method used here, which produced a z-score of 1.87, which indicates
statistical significance at the 0.03 level.
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assessments legislators try to maintain among their constituents in order to win reelection. The results in this paper
indicate that the representative-constituent relationship is foundationally stronger relative to partisan leanings when
legislators can identify with their constituents based on pre-existing local ties in the district.
That these elements of the member-constituent relationship can have such a tremendous impact in this particular era
makes these results all the more striking. The recent emphasis on the overwhelming power of parties and partisanship
in congressional elections can leave campaigns (or even potential campaigns) feeling deterministic, and that nothing
about candidates other than the party label next to their name truly matters. Scholars, political analysts and
commentators have pointed out the increasing correlation between partisan vote choice in congressional and
presidential elections in this century; for example, many journalistic outlets like FiveThirtyEight and the Cook
Political Report use prior presidential vote in a district as the foundation for their race ratings. But in recent elections,
and in particular the 2018 midterms, the parties have also fielded uniquely compelling local candidates with
biographies that helped them significantly outperform their party’s presidential nominees in districts they had no
business being competitive in, at least from a partisan perspective. The empirical analysis in this paper - which controls
for partisan balance - demonstrates that this local advantage is not isolated, but rather a wide-ranging effect that is
robust across all parties, election types, and geographic areas.
In addition, because party majorities in Congress are more volatile than they have been in nearly a century (Lee 2016),
for incumbents their party label itself can be a blessing in one election, and a curse in the next. Local roots in the
district have the opposite effect: while they indeed do not pack quite as powerful a punch as partisanship does, they
are an unfettered benefit for legislators aiming for a positive reputation among their constituents. When legislators
have deep local roots in the district, they have more stable constituent relationships, with stronger and more meaningful
foundations that should help them withstand partisan competition and change at the national and district levels.
Presumably, without deep local roots, more legislators would be more vulnerable to the increasingly volatile partisan
winds in any given election. And notably, local roots are a connection that does not require sacrificing one
subconstituency for another, since local attachments are in theory not limited by the extent of a voter’s partisanship
or ideological tendencies. As Hopkins (2018) elegantly put it in his recent work on electoral nationalization around
the two parties, “One doesn’t have to espouse certain political views to be a proud Rhode Islander or South Dakotan.”
(11)
Finally, this analysis should induce scholars to reexamine what representation in Congress means amidst the
nationalized partisan lens through which most analysts tend to view congressional elections and representation. These
results on the whole suggest that while both voters and candidates are participating in elections dictated more and
more by partisanship, the candidates themselves continue to matter beyond partisanship. This is particularly the case
in the American context, in which candidate-centric elections and “personal votes” (Cain et al. 1987; Carey and
Shugart 1995; Grofman 2005) are conducive to the use of local roots and other differentiating candidate qualities. But
more specifically, the results from Hypothesis 2 indicate not just that legislators’ local ties matter, but that – like other
discrete candidate qualities – they matter more when shared with their particular constituents. The persistent impact
of local roots in House elections show not just that candidate traits still matter, but that they matter more when they
are dyadically shared with their district’s voters.
This persistent candidate-centrism, particularly in the area of local qualifications, is largely possible because
Americans still choose their elected leaders in the House based on geographic representation. The framers of the
Constitution understood that the unifying nature of a shared community made it important to base our political
representation in geography: members of the House of Representatives were originally intended not to represent
simply one of two national factions, but rather the unique, decentralized, and vastly differing interests of their local
communities to prevent any one (or, in today’s case, two) factions from wielding too much influence (Hamilton,
Madison, and Jay 1788). As a result of the natural commonality that geography provides, local roots in the district
may be uniquely suited to stand against the detrimental effects of partisan polarization and nationalized tribalism that
the founders warned against. Perhaps leveraging local roots and other nonpartisan tools to restore a shared sense of
pride in American community life can ensure that the “People’s House” does not simply become the “Party’s House.”
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Main Text Tables and Figures

Table 1
Effects on Partisan Overperformance, 2002-2018
Dependent Variable
Local Roots Index

Partisan Overperformance
1.37***
(0.23)

Postgraduate Degree

-0.30
(0.59)

Non-Local Political Experience

-0.32
(0.57)

Business Background

-0.30
(0.67)

Co-Racial Pres. Nominee

2.40***
(0.47)

District Partisan Advantage (Cook PVI)

-0.34***
(0.03)

Generic Congressional Ballot Advantage

1.42***
(0.05)

Primary Opposition

-0.89**
(0.41)

Chamber Leadership

-1.96
(2.40)

Terms Served in Congress

0.62***
(0.07)

Quality Challenger

-3.55***
(0.50)

Straight-Ticket Voting Allowed

-0.34
(0.70)

Time

-1.53***
(0.10)

Constant

14.07***
(1.01)

Wald(ch-2)

1846.67

N
2947
Note: Results found using mixed-effects multilevel regression with random
intercepts by incumbent; standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .1, **p < .05, ***p <.01
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Fig. 1: Distributions incumbent partisan overperformance, 2002-2018. The variable is calculated by
subtracting a presidential nominee’s margin in the district from that of their co-partisan incumbent
House member. Only includes incumbents who faced major-party challengers.

Fig. 2: Distribution of incumbent members of the U.S. House running for reelection on
seven component measures of Local Roots, 2002-2018 elections.
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Fig. 3: Predicted partisan overperformance in the district based on the incumbent’s local
roots in the district as measured by the Local Roots Index. Upper and lower bounds around
the linear prediction represent 95% confidence intervals for predicted values. Effects found
using mixed-effects modeling with random intercepts by incumbent.

Fig. 4: Predicted effects of selected independent variables on incumbent partisan
overperformance in the district. Effects bounded by 95% confidence intervals and found
using mixed-effects modeling with random intercepts by incumbent.
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Fig. 5: Predicted effects of local roots on incumbent partisan overperformance in the district with split
samples based on the long-term mobility of voting-age constituents in tertiles. Predicted effects bounded by
95% confidence intervals, found using mixed-effects modeling with random intercepts by incumbent.
Appendix
Table A1
Descriptive Statistics - Contested Non-Open House Races (2002-2018)
N=2947
Partisan Overperformance (Presidential)

Mean
9.0

SD
14.84

Min
-46

Max
97

Local Roots Index

2.0

1.38

0

6

% Constituents Born In-State

0.5

0.17

0.07

0.88

Co-Racial Pres. Nominee

0.7

0.46

0

1

District Partisan Advantage

9.3

9.97

-22.3

44

National Partisan Advantage

-0.3

3.74

-6.2

6.2

Primary Opposition

0.4

0.48

0

1

Chamber/Party Leader

0.0

0.10

0

1

Terms Served

5.4

4.33

0

29

Challenger Quality

0.2

0.38

0

1

Straight-Ticket Voting Allowed

0.3

0.45

0

1

Alternate Specifications for Local Roots Index
While the raw Local Roots Index used this paper provides consistent results, there could exist concerns that some
components of the Index matter more than others; or, that the district-level is the wrong jurisdiction in which to
measure roots. In order to alleviate these concerns, I have reproduced findings for Hypothesis 1 using two alternate
measures. The first uses factor analysis to produce a factor score version of the Local Roots Index. This score was
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calculated using factor analysis on the 7 component local roots indicators and constraining to a single factor. The
second swaps “district roots” for “state roots”, using the same coding process as described on pages 15-17, but
widening the parameters of local roots to the state level (i.e., was a legislator born in their home state?).

Fig. A1: Predicted total effects of local roots on incumbent partisan overperformance in the district
using alternative specifications of the Local Roots Index. Predicted effects bounded by 95%
confidence intervals, found using mixed-effects modeling with random intercepts by incumbent.
Figure A1 above is a visual representation of the total additive effect that each alternate Local Roots specification has
on Partisan Overperformance. While there is some slight variation in the total effects, all specifications have both
substantively and statistically significant effects in the expected direction. Effects are similarly consistent for
subsequent models in other chapters. Given the robustness of all specifications, I chose to continue to use the raw
Local Roots index because it created greater fidelity to the original data values, and produced more intuitive
descriptive scores and marginal effect predictions for each of the models.
While factor analysis allows for more flexibility in the influence of individual components of an index like this, it
could alternately be useful to see how much individual influence each factor has separately from the others. Figure
A2 below reproduces seven separate coefficients for Hypothesis 1, swapping the Local Roots Index for each
component in turn. While all of them have consistently positive coefficients (and all but three are statistically
significant), this is not a particularly useful method of assessing individual impacts, since excluding all six other
factors assumes that they do not exist in the eyes of either the voters or the MC and have no impact, when in reality
all seven measures are components of a unified concept - local roots - and are taken together as a singular local
credential. Additionally, including all seven factors as separate independent variables in the same model would also
not suffice. This model would by definition assume that all seven factors are completely independent of and unrelated
to each other, which they are not, both in observation and underneath the single concept of local roots.
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Fig. A2: Predicted total effects of alternate local roots components separately on incumbent partisan
overperformance in the district. Predicted effects bounded by 95% confidence intervals, found using
mixed-effects modeling with random intercepts by incumbent.
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The raw regression results for each of these relevant specifications can be found below in Table A2.

Table A2 - Alternative Local Roots Specifications
Effects on Partisan Overperformance, 2002-2018
Dependent Variable

Partisan
Overperformance
Alternate LRI Specifications

Local Roots Index (Original)

1.37***
(0.23)

Local Roots Index (Factor Score)

2.01***
(0.41)

Local Roots Index (State Roots)

1.11***
(0.22)

Component Measures Tested Individually
Local Political Dynasty

5.72***
(1.26)

Born In District

2.39***
(0.65)

High School in District

3.25***
(0.64)

Undergrad in District

0.65
(0.67)

Postgrad in District

0.47
(0.00)

Local Political Experience

0.76
(0.73)

Local Business Owner

3.70***
(0.99)
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Fig. A3: Distribution of District-level percentages of votingage constituents who were born in their current home state.
Measure obtained from American Community Survey
estimates.

Fig. A4: Distribution of Incumbent MCs’ scores on the Local Roots
Index from 2002-2018.
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Table A3: Observational Examples of Local Roots (Local Political Dynasty)
Name

District Family Relation Family Member Name Former Overlapping Office

Doris Matsui (D)

CA-5

Spouse

Robert Matsui (D)

House Rep. (CA-5)

Bill Shuster (R)

PA-9

Father

Bud Shuster (R)

House Rep. (PA-9)

Tulsi Gabbard (D)

HI-2

Father

Mike Gabbard (D)

HI State Senate

Mario Diaz-Balart (R) FL-25

Brother

Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R) House Rep. (FL-21)

Jim Matheson (D)

Father

Scott M. Matheson (D) Governor (UT)

UT-4

Table A4: Observational Examples of Local Roots (Birthplace and Education)
Name

District

Rosa DeLauro (D)

CT-3

Years
Served

Local Roots
Measure

Institution

Overlapping
City

1991-present Local Birth

N/A

John Rutherford (R) FL-4

2017-present Local High School

Nathan Bedford Forrest HS Jacksonville, FL

Lane Evans (D)

IL-17

1983-2007

Augustana College

Steven Palazzo (R)

MS-4

2006-present Local Postgrad

Local Undergrad

New Haven, CT
Rock Island, IL

University of S. Mississippi Hattiesburg, MS

Table A5: Observational Examples of Local Roots (Local Political Experience)
Name
Zoe Lofgren (D)

District Years Served Local Political Office

Jurisdiction

CA-16 1995-present Board of Supervisors Santa Clara County, CA

Donald Young (R) AK-0

1967-present Mayor

Fort Yukon, AK

Mike Ross (D)

AR-4

2001-2013

Nevada County, AR

Cheri Bustos (D)

IL-17

2013-present City Council

Quorum Court

East Moline, IL

Table A6: Observational Examples of Local Roots (Local Business Ownership)
Name

District Years Served

Business Type

Overlapping City/County

Mike Thompson (D)

CA-1

1999-present Vineyard

Middletown, CA (Napa Valley)

Gus Bilirakis (R)

FL-9

2007-present Law Practice

Palm Harbor, FL

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R) FL-27

1989-2019

Private School

Hialeah, FL

Jim Marshall (D)

2003-2011

Law/Business Consulting Macon, GA

GA-8
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Table A7 - Effects on Partisan Overperformance, 2002-2018
Dependent Variable
All Legislators

Partisan Overperformance
1.37***
(0.23)

N
2947

Served 1-3 terms

1.68***
(0.33)

918

Served 4-6 terms

1.40***
(0.32)

877

Served 7-9 terms

1.41***
(0.45)

557

Served 10 terms or more

1.22**
(0.49)

595
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